Lets remind ourselves of Piketty’s core argument. He suggests that wealth inequality is growing because capital is accumulating much faster than income in Europe and the USA.
This can be measured by the rise in capital-income ratios, which we looked at on Monday.
Capital is equal to 5-6 years national income in most European countries (national income is around $2.5 trillion in France, hence multiply it by 6 to get a sense of the total capital stock).
What we observed in the last lecture, however, is that the ratio of capital to income over the long-run has remained remarkably stable in Europe since 1800, with the exception of the period 1950-1980.This is where we observe a decline in capital-income ratios, or a shock to capital.
But despite the stability in capital-income ratios, the composition of capital (and wealth) has fundamentally changed. Housing-real estate and domestic/finance capital have replaced agricultural land. Capital has been transformed.
In this lecture we will look at:
- the shocks to capital in Europe from 1950-1980
- the evolution of the capital-income ratio in the USA
- the importance of slavery in the origins of US capitalism
Figure 4.5 depicts national capital in Europe from 1870-2010. This long term trend is useful as it captures the two waves of globalization that have shaped capitalist development (1870-1910 and 1980-present).
Germany, France and the UK are only three countries but they can be considered representative of Western Europe, given that they constitute more than two-thirds of national income in Western Europe.
All the available estimates reveal a similar capital/income ratio for Spain, Italy, Austria and the Netherlands (Spain experienced a more rapid rise due in their capital/income ratios, much like Ireland, due to it’s housing bubble in the 2000’s).
The shock to wealth
What caused the shock to capital in Europe during the 20th century, which can be observed in the decline in capital-income ratios?
One obvious answer is the physical destruction of buildings, factories and infrastructure during the two world wars.
In France, physical destruction was equal to one year of national income. In Germany it was one and a half years national income. In Britain it was less than one years national income. Hence, physical destruction only explains part of the decline.
The budgetary and political shocks of the two world wars proved far more destructive to capital than combat itself.
The loss of foreign capital-assets, the low savings rate and physical destruction explain two thirds of the loss of wealth, whereas the new forms of capital ownership, and new forms of capital rental-regulation, associated with the post-war ‘mixed market economy’, explain the final third.
- Capital regulations, decline in real estate and stock market prices = 25-33% of decline
- Low national savings, loss of foreign assets and physical destruction = 66-70% of decline
It is very important to remember this as it will help us to explain the rebound of capital-income ratios from the 1970’s, especially in the 1990’s and 2000’s. The rise in capital-income ratios in the 21st century, I will suggest, can largely be explained by rising commercial and real estate prices. It is a price effect.
The period 1914-1945 was a dark period for the wealthy in Europe; The Bolsheviks defaulted on French loans, Nasser nationalized the Suez canal, and wealthy individuals across Britain were forced to sell their foreign colonial assets to make up for lost savings.
Those owning stocks and bonds lost a fortune when Wall Street crashed before the great depression.
But from the 1950 onwards it was not the external shocks that shaped the nature of capitalist development rather it was government fiscal and socio-economic policies, which reduced the market value and economic power of those who owned capital-assets.
Post war Europe was a form of state-directed capitalism, which gave birth to different national models of capitalism across North, West, East and Southern Europe.
In he West, real estate prices fell relative to the price of goods and services. House prices stood at historically low levels, owing primarily to rent control policies, which not only meant that housing became significantly less expensive, but that landlords earned less on their properties.
The stock value of corporations and firms also fell to historically low levels. The state nationalised industries, across various sectors of the economy, all over the continent. Dividends and profits were heavily taxed, whilst shareholders were weakened vis-a-vis other stakeholders.
It was the period of Keynesian demand management or “mixed market” economies, where the state took responsibility for guaranteeing employment. This radical new role for the state can be observed directly in rising tax revenues (measured as a per cent of national income).
Post war Europe gave birth to the social state.
But what about the evolution of capital/income ratios in the USA? Figure 4.6 shows that “wealth” mattered less in the New World (USA) than the Old World (Europe).
National capital was worth less than 3 times national income from 1770-1810 whereas it was worth 7 times in Britain and France. What explains this divergence?
It can primarily be explained by the price of agricultural land. There was so much land in the US that its market value was worth very little. The volume effect outweighed the price effect (remember Ricardo’s scarcity principle).
Domestic capital was also worth much less. This is because the US population were predominately immigrants. They arrived without houses, businesses, machinery, tools or factories. It takes years to accumulate this type of capital.
Hence, from the beginning, the influence of accumulated (inherited) wealth was less important in America when compared to Europe. Land cost little and anyone could become a landowner.
All of this has probably contributed to the Jeffersonian ideal of the ‘small landowner, riding out west, free and equal’. The American dream was born.
But by 1910 national capital had begun to accumulate rapidly, particularly in real estate and industrial capital, such that it amounted to 5 times national income.
The US had become capitalist, and industrial, but inherited wealth still had much less influence over the economy than in “old” Europe.
The shocks of the 20th century also struck America with far less violence.
Capital shocks in the US
Capital-income ratios were far more stable, fluctuating between 4-5 times national income from 1910 to 2010.
It was only after the Great Depression and World War II did the structure of capital change. This was primarily because Franklin D Roosevelt specifically adopted policies to reduce the influence of private capital, such as introducing rent controls.
But unlike in Europe, the US did not adopt policies of nationalisation. It was not the same type of “state directed capitalism” that occurred in Europe.
Rather, from the 1940s onwards, a series of public investment programs were launched, in addition to sweeping changes in progressive taxation. Public debt increased to fund the war effort but this eventually returned to a modest level in 1970.
Figure 4.7 shows that America continues to have net public wealth i.e. its assets exceed public debt.
Overall, the capital-income ratio in the US is far more stable than in Europe. This might explain why Americans tend to have a far more benign view of capitalist development than Europeans.
In 2010, capital in the USA was worth around 4.5 times national income. National income in the US is around $17 trillion, whilst in the EU it is around $18 trillion. Hence, multiply 17 trillion by 4.5 to get a sense of what the overall value of national capital/wealth is (measured in terms of market prices).
It would be a mistake to conclude our analysis on the structural transformation of capital in the USA and Europe without discussing slavery.
Thomas Jefferson didn’t just own land in Virginia, he owned 600 slaves and these obviously didn’t form part of his ideal of the land of the free. Slavery was eventually abolished in 1865.
In 1800 slaves represented 20 percent of the US population: roughly 1 million slaves out of a total population of 5 million. In the South, slaves represented 40 percent of the population: roughly 1 million slaves out of a population of 2.5 million.
By 1860 the slave population had fallen to 15 percent or 4 million slaves in a population of 30 million. This can be explained primarily by population growth in the north and west. In the south it remained above 40 percent.
What was the price of a slave?
Figure 4.10 shows that the total market value of slaves represented 1.5 years of national income in the early 19th century (this is equal to the total value of farmland).
Remarkably, this implies that slave-owners in southern US states controlled more wealth than the aristocratic landlords in old Europe.
Black slaves and the land they worked equalled 4 times national income in southern states. The northern (land capital) and southern states (slave capital) is the USA during their period were completely different worlds.
Remember southern blacks were deprived of civil rights until the 1960’s. Racial tensions in the US, arguably, goes a long way to explaining the peculiar development of the US welfare state, and the type of inequality that the US experiences today.
Further, it’s important to acknowledge that slavery was a significant factor that led to the particular trajectory of capitalist development in the US, as suggested by this research.
Next week we will analyze the comeback of capital and wealth inequality since 1970. Lecture 8